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INTRODUCTION
Our federal government annually passes up more than $75 billion in potential revenue in
an effort to guide that money to the States under section 164 of the Tax Code, the provision
allowing itemizing taxpayers to deduct the cost of the state and local income, property and (to a
limited extent) sales taxes they paid during the tax year.1 The eye-popping size of that number
makes section 164 a perennial issue in tax policy circles, and, as one of the deductions omitted
from the Alternative Minimum Tax’s parallel tax universe, the section is also a key component of
debates about the AMT.2 Indeed, the President’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform recommends
eliminating the deduction to pay for its proposed AMT reform.3 Other Bush administration
rumblings that axing the deduction may be on their agenda, even aside from any possible AMT
fix, make a reconsideration of section 164 especially timely.4
It has been almost a decade since the last comprehensive legal academic examination of
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the merits of the deduction.5 This Article aims, humbly, at attempting to update that earlier work
with recent developments and new insights. To date, scholarly examination of the deduction has
focused on its fairness, or “horizontal equity,” as well as the role it may play in encouraging
localities to raise more of their own tax revenues. My focus here is on the latter. One view I do
not consider, though, is the taxation of corporations and other entities. As I suspect the reader
will see, the nuances of individual taxation provide more than enough material for one paper;
corporations and their additional complexities must await another day.
On the fairness front, prevailing wisdom questions the traditional equitable justification
for the deduction. Under the traditional view, it was said, two people who make the same money
are not equal if one pays more state tax than the other.6 Thus, the federal tax system should favor
the higher state-tax payer. Later critics argued that this was considering only half the apple (or
half the orange); state taxes generate services, which increase taxpayer well-being.7 So, the
critics said, the higher-tax payer, like a consumer who buys a product at retail, has less money in
her pocket at the end of the year but is just as well off as the taxpayer with more money but fewer
services.8 Further analysis showed that the equity question actually turned on complicated
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empirical questions of who truly bore the burden of a given state tax -- was it true, in other
words, that taxpayers got everything they paid for?9 Those questions, too, I reserve for
discussion elsewhere.
Instead I focus here on challenges to the deduction’s use as a “tax expenditure,” or
subsidy. For example, the President’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform reportedly believes that
the deduction causes citizens to overinvest in local government, because that spending is taxfavored compared to private purchase of government-like services. That echoes a claim raised by
President Reagan’s Treasury Department prior to the 1986 reforms.10
Whatever one’s view about the economics of the Advisory Panel’s argument, whether or
not it is of concern ultimately turns on whether we would like to see some services now carried
out by the federal government or in the private sector shifted to state and local government. I
argue here that, to the extent we may desire such a shift, the deduction may be an imperfect tool
for accomplishing it. The tax literature so far does not consider the possible effects of the
deduction on the actual quality of state and local governance. Yet local governments develop in
response both to direct political demands and also the indirect pressure generated by the threat of
“exit,” or out-migration to a more efficient or more responsive jurisdiction. The deduction, I
argue, significantly affects both of these factors -- most obviously by reducing exit pressures, but
also by in more subtle ways transforming the processes of direct politics.
Further, most commentators claim that the deduction is in theory warranted (albeit
administratively difficult to implement) in order to encourage local tax jurisdictions to raise and
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spend money in ways that benefit their neighbors.11 Since each locality fails to internalize the
benefits of these “spillovers,” the argument goes, a deduction may help to move local spending
closer to the ideal level the localities would choose if their incentives were properly aligned.12 In
fact, though, localities do internalize spillover benefits. Localities may use spillovers as a form
of inter-jurisdictional bribe to influence the behavior of outsiders. In combination with a variety
of frictions and biases, that bribe allows the briber to reduce free-riding by neighbors and, in
some instances, permits it to export the costs of its services onto the unwitting bribees.
But this is not to say I am on the side of the President’s Advisory Panel. While I
acknowledge flaws in the way that the deduction now functions, I also argue that condemning the
deduction on the basis of present failings could prove short-sighted. The deduction can in fact be
an important instrument for reforming the administration of cooperative regulation between the
federal government, states, and private stakeholders.
In addition, the deduction may facilitate shared state and federal tax enforcement, a
necessity for states in a world where it is ever easier to hide wealth through complex
international transactions. For cognitive and distributional reasons it may be difficult for states to
tax the same base as the federal government, and therefore difficult most effectively to share
enforcement resources with it. The deduction arguably offsets some of these “stacking”
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limitations. It also can be centripetal force for what would otherwise be an ever-diversifying set
of state tax rules.
These conclusions, I should acknowledge at the outset, are first steps, not final ones. The
novel benefits of the deduction I identify might justify only a targeted or more nuanced
deduction. And the relative societal value of those goals is likely a sum that can be computed
only through the market of political ideas.
As for the roadmap of the paper, Part I orients the reader in the mechanics of section 164
and the extant policy arguments on either side. Part II explains the benefits of shared tax
enforcement, and notes that depending on unresolved empirical questions the deduction may be
helpful in achieving those benefits. Part III considers the possibility that the deduction could
function as a tax expenditure to subsidize state spending. I analyze three distinct forms of
spending that we might imagine the deduction could subsidize, and identify significant problems
with all three. I conclude, however, that the stability offered by the deduction may make it one
among several viable tools for locally-controlled redistributive taxing and spending. Finally, Part
IV outlines the possible impact of a deduction on state and local governance, both in the current
anarchic state of that governance and in a possible “experimentalist” or collaborative regime
designed to remedy some of the pathologies of the present.
I. Background
The federal deduction for state and local taxes paid is as old as the federal income tax
itself. For much of its life, though, it has been short on theoretical justification. Most
commentators initially seemed to view the deduction as simply an equitable measure intended to
put on an equal footing those who earned similar incomes in jurisdictions with differing tax
5

rates.13 That equity explanation, though, foundered somewhat in the face of the fact that the
deduction was available only to itemizers.14
Contemporary commentators are skeptical of the equity argument on other grounds, as
well. The central insight of the contemporary view is that state taxpayers get what they pay for.15
Local taxes, for example, pay for schools, filled potholes, plowed roads, and all the rest of the
basket of services a municipality might provide. Some townships exact much higher taxes, but
they also spend much more on services, especially education. State taxes offer highways,
statewide education grants, national guardsmen. In this view, the equity argument melts away.
Two taxpayers earning equal salaries in different jurisdictions might pay different tax rates, but
they are still equally well-off.16 One has less money in her pocket, but she also has purchased a
set of services that leave her better off than her counterpart in the low-tax jurisdiction.
Ultimately, this turns out to be at best a very rough view of the actual picture of tax-benefit
tradeoffs. For purposes of this paper, though, my only goal is to note that the prevailing view is
that the equity justification for a deduction is fairly weak, especially if one accounts for the
administrative difficulties of more precise measures of equity that depart from the assumption
that services received equals taxes paid.17
Some economists, however, have also suggested that the deduction could be viewed as a
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tax expenditure on behalf of state governments.18 That is, although the deduction nominally is
claimed by individual taxpayers, it was said that the benefit flowed in the end to state taxing
authorities.19 In effect, the cost of any deductible state tax would decline by its taxpayers’
marginal federal rate.20 That would, in theory, allow the state to raise rates by the same margin
without reducing the portion of state private output devoted to taxation or, more importantly,
without incurring any additional political resistance.21 Empirical studies seemed to bear out this
analysis to some extent, showing that states do tend to raise and spend somewhat more revenues
from deductible than from non-deductible taxes.22
A concrete example here may be helpful. Suppose I earn $100,000, I itemize deductions,
and my federal marginal tax rate is 28%. Let us say that Washington, D.C. imposes a further
10% tax on my earnings. Without deductibility my take-home pay is 100-28-10=$62,000. With
deductibility, it is 100-10-(28-(.28*10))=$64,800. Knowing that I have received $2,800 from the
federal government, the District might respond by increasing its own taxes to recapture some of
my savings. Assuming that I was willing politically to tolerate a combined tax burden that left
me with $62,000 in the first instance, I may well be willing to accept the same burden with some
of the tax revenue now shifted to the District.
18
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Yet, as the President’s Advisory Panel seemingly has concluded, the very effectiveness of
the deduction may subject it to criticism from classical tax policy. As with many expenditures,
the deduction is not “neutral”; that is, it distorts the incentives of some economic actors.23 As we
have just seen, the deduction might arguably encourage state governments to levy more taxes
than they otherwise would, since the additional tax in a sense is paid for by the federal
government rather than by the states’ own taxpayers. If nothing else, the deduction very likely
induces state taxing authorities to shift their tax to those tax bases covered by the deduction, in
order to maximize the revenue benefits from the federal government to its citizens.24
That leaves us to grope for an explanation for why such distortions might be desirable. If
our only goal is to shift taxation from the federal government to the states, why not simply lower
federal rates across the board rather than giving the deduction? Is there a good reason to think
state governments would tax at less than optimal levels without a deduction?
The literature thus far offers two general answers. The first posits that redistributive
taxing and spending is difficult on the state level.25 To take the most basic example, assume that
individuals are rationally self-interested, and that they can easily gather and comprehend
information about the relationship between the taxes they pay and the benefits they realize not
only in their own jurisdiction but in a number of others, each of which they could relocate to
relatively costlessly. In that situation, we might expect that a tax system that took money from
23
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Taxpayer A to give to Taxpayer B might prompt A to move to somewhere that did not. If
Taxpayer A’s jurisdiction wants to keep her and her tax dollars from fleeing, it must reduce or
abandon its redistribution efforts. On the other hand, unless A wants to give up the benefits of
U.S. residency, it will be rather harder for her to escape redistributive taxing by the national
government.26 So the deduction might be a form of redistributive federalism, in which the
national government shares its tax dollars with states, who can then soften the blow of their own
redistributive taxes.27
Relatedly, some writers have also claimed that the deduction may be a way for the federal
government to encourage positive externalities.28 Some of the things a state spends its money on
might benefit not only its own taxpayers but also its neighbors. Good roads, clean air, safe
shopping districts, schools that produce potential skilled employees -- all likely appeal nearly as
much to nearby states as the state itself.29 And, in a sense, the existence of other desirable
locations other than the one we live in now might benefit us even if we don’t directly enjoy its
scenic vistas or top-tier law schools. The opportunity to relocate when times get dark in our own
neck of the woods might be a form of insurance, allowing us to take risks with our own local
governance. Neighbors can be a source of best practices to instruct us how to do our own
governing better. And the threat of easy relocation to an appealing alternative might serve as a
disciplining force on our current state government. The trouble is that each individual state
government has no obvious incentive to internalize all the benefits of these positive
26
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externalities.30 The deduction, some have suggested, moves in that direction by at least
encouraging state governments to spend in ways that might produce some benefits to others.31
Obviously, though, there are serious counter-arguments to both of these claims. Both, for
example, seem to rely heavily on the assumption that states will make beneficial use of the
deduction rather than simply lowering their own tax burden. And both make extensive
assumptions about why and how easily people move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Nor does
either offer a good reason, aside from administrability, to push states to impose income, property,
and sales taxes over any others. I return to these problems later in the paper.
Another set of challenges for the deduction was laid out in 1996 by Harvard professor
Louis Kaplow. On the redistribution point, Kaplow argues that it is possible that subsidies are
not necessary to produce local redistribution. Programs we term “redistributive” might result
instead from a locality’s view that such spending in fact produces good for the whole community.
If not, potential transferees might have enough political power to extract transfers from others.32
In either case, he claims, redistribution is indistinguishable from any other local government
service.33 His view of spillovers is similar.34 Alternatively, where redistribution might be
efficient or otherwise desirable from a national perspective, Kaplow argues that we would be
better off with direct spending instead of a deduction.35 Deductions, he says, are regressive,
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because they are most valuable to taxpayers with higher income.36 They also are not especially
well targeted to reward only redistribution or spillover spending, and offer little transparency or
political accountability to ensure that they are money well spent.37
My aim over the remainder of this paper is to examine how durable these conclusions
prove in light of other claims based in fiscal federalism and regulatory theory.
II. A State Subsidy?
The traditional view of the deduction as tax expenditure rejects the claim that tax
preferences for state and local spending lead to too much local government. In a sentence, the
basic argument here is that it is difficult for states to tax without driving away taxpayers to lowertax states, so that federal subsidies help to transfer money from a central taxing jurisdiction that
is not easily escaped back to competing states.38 This position, which I’ll call the “state subsidy”
view, has attracted proponents as diverse as Marty Feldstein and Mario Cuomo.39 Perhaps
because of that apparently broad agreement, its treatment in the legal literature is fairly thin,
although it has attracted at least two very persuasive critics. In this Part I try to flesh out the state
subsidy explanation, and examine the skeptics’ claims. Ultimately, I find the subsidy argument
somewhat tenable, but not generally for the reasons most commentators have previously said.
And I conclude that the strongest arguments may bring the subsidy directly into conflict with any
effort to encourage states and the federal government to tax the same base.
36
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A. Redistribution
In its classic formulation, the tax expenditure argument for the deduction posits that it is
difficult for the States to impose some forms of taxation. Typically, the state subsidy proponent
will begin her argument by noting that taxpayers may flee a high-tax jurisdiction for a lower, so
that states race to the bottom of the bracket to prevent population and capital leakage.40 In this
view, there is downward pressure on state taxes, resulting from the simple fact that some
taxpayers pay more than they get, and would prefer that it were otherwise.41 Indeed, many
proponents of the state subsidy theory suggest that the subsidy is not to support state spending
generally, but rather to ensure the possibility of state redistributive spending.42 That claim is
directly contrary to the view of the President’s Advisory Panel, which argues that favorable tax
treatment encourages over-consumption of state government.
The argument in favor of subsidy rests largely on exit pressures. Suppose that citizens
flee or threaten credibly to flee from a jurisdiction that imposes redistributive taxation upon
them. It then becomes much easier for the federal government, whose tax authority it is very
difficult for individuals to escape, to extract more than it gives to an individual. In the abstract
states might cooperate or negotiate to prevent destructive rate competition.43 It is generally
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thought, though, that cooperation between states (other than through the federal government) is
unlikely to be sustainable, because of the high transaction costs in reaching agreement with so
many other jurisdictions and because of the large benefits that would flow to defectors from any
tax cartel.44 Taxation at the federal level largely mitigates both these problems.45 The deduction
then returns some of the resulting extra revenue capacity to states.46 Predictably, though, there
are some potential holes in this theory.
First, it may not be quite right that the States can’t effectively impose redistributive taxes.
Some economists suggest that in certain circumstances the existence of a tax in jurisdiction A
may actually encourage jurisdiction B to impose a similar tax.47 Suppose, for instance, we have
nextdoor states A and B. A imposes a luxury tax on the sale of african diamond-crusted widgets.
Demand for ADCW’s now shifts to B, where, in all likelihood, it drives up the price. Perhaps
money now flows from B to african widget-makers, who have integrated their wholesale and
retail businesses. At some point, the price in B and tax rate in A reach an equilibrium point at
which buyers are indifferent between purchases in either state. In this scenario, the state of B has
a fairly clear-cut incentive to impose its own luxury tax. Since the incidence of A’s tax rests in
part on consumers in B,48 and that money benefits either A’s citizens or african widget-makers, B
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would be better served imposing a tax that brought its own ADCW prices to the equilibrium
point and keeping the resulting money in benefits for B residents. Obviously, this example is
exceedingly simplified, especially in that it is built to exclude the possible effects of changes in
wage rates and return to capital in the event that some ADCW manufacturers or retailers are
themselves resident in A or B. But the point is that the possibility that states can sometimes
export the burden of their taxes may lead to upwards, rather than downwards, tax pressure.
There don’t seem to be any good data on how often, if at all, this actually occurs, though.
Second, we might wonder whether in fact exit is a significant source of downward
pressure on redistributive taxation. Certainly, as we saw, there are major frictions that limit exit.
But credible threats of exit are likely more important than exit itself.49 Many commenters of
earlier drafts also wondered whether people really relocate for tax reasons. Limited empirical
data suggest that tax is, in fact, a significant motivator in the relocation decisions of at least
wealthy individuals and small business owners (who are usually taxed only as individuals,
because their business is taxed as a pass-through entity).50 That data is especially significant in
light of the possibility, as I suggest in more detail later, that the existence of the deduction itself
dampens mobility. That we can measure some mobility effect notwithstanding the influence of
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the deduction suggests that exit, and exit-driven downward pressures, would be rather greater in
its absence. Depending on how strong the downward pressure is, that conclusion implies that the
President’s Panel is wrong that the deduction creates over-consumption of state government,
rather than helping to balance out the downward pressure exerted by interstate competition.
A more potent objection, then, might be that it is unclear why we should prefer
redistributive spending by the States to similar spending by the federal government. Professor
Stark, for example, recently has argued that as a “normative” matter we should prefer federal to
state redistribution.51 That is, he claims that exit is inefficient, because of the deadweight losses
that attach to gathering information and uprooting.52 But the main argument usually offered in
favor of federalism is that it is efficient.53 Exit is supposed to ensure that resources flow to where
they are most useful, and to chasten local governments to be more effective.54 The question then
becomes whether the supposed efficiency losses that attend localized redistribution predominate
over the efficiency gains of dispersed delivery of government services.55
51

Stark, supra note 11, at 1395.
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Although I sound skeptical, in fact I do agree that local redistribution may sometimes be
inferior to national efforts. As other writers have described, it is possible to design national
systems in a way that permits, even magnifies, the diversity and autonomy benefits of
federalism.56 A central federal authority regulating in collaboration with the States can serve as a
clearinghouse for information, force states to be more forthcoming about the quality of the
services they are delivering, render the data in a way that facilitates comparison, and thereby
perhaps encourage migration from laggards.57 Of course, not all federal spending programs are
designed so well. For now, though, the comparative efficiency debate looks like a draw.
A key point, however, is that the deduction may itself affect the efficiency both of state
and federal governance. I discuss in the next Part some ways in which the deduction may
actually degrade the quality of state government, an outcome that certainly gives us pause about
the wisdom of encouraging redistribution by those governments. Still, the tax system may offer
its own potential to ensure that the funds it disburses to states for redistribution are spent well. It
should be possible, in theory, to create a sort of market for the deduction, in which states are
rewarded for transparency and penalized (by the market or regulators) for highly inefficient
outcomes. In that situation we would be inclined to say that the “normative” case against using
the deduction to encourage state-level redistribution is weak.
In sum, there is only moderate bite to claims by critics that fiscal supports for state
government redistributive projects distort the market for state government. Rather, federal
subsidies generally restore consumer choice to a marketplace otherwise crippled by collective
that these debates overlook the potential impact of the deduction itself.
56
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action problems. But the case for using tax deductions, rather than direct spending, to achieve
that end is not at this point as clear cut. There are trade-offs between the tax and spending
alternatives that may warrant choice of one or the other in different circumstances, a problem I
return to shortly in section D of this Part.
B. Devolution
There is another challenge for the state subsidy theory. Recall the argument, generally
advantaged in the context of analyses of the “tax equity” of the deduction, that annually state
taxes roughly equal the benefits a given individual taxpayer receives.58 Under that premise, it
quickly becomes difficult to see the tax expenditure argument for the deduction. If there is a
rough equilibrium in most jurisdictions between taxes and services, though, then there is no race
to bottom to avoid burdensome transfer payments. Taxpayers may relocate to find their desired
level of taxing and spending. But they lose as much as they gain if they prefer more services and
flee to a low-tax, low-service state.
There is a residual argument for the state subsidy position, though. Or, really, an
argument that was there all along. The only reason we care about whether states are able to tax is
if we are in favor of state spending. Quite possibly, we could respond to the fact that states can’t
raise much revenue by shrugging and then taxing and spending almost exclusively at the federal
level. So the state subsidy claim is really a claim about federalism – that local spending is better,
whether because it facilitates nationwide experimentation, maximizes autonomy, encourages a
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spirit of community, or achieves some other similar set of values that we might imagine.59 The
particulars aren’t important just yet. The point is that the deduction would have the effect of
moving money from federal hands to state hands so that, without necessarily changing the
amount of government services purchased nationwide, we’ve reduced the scope of federal
operations and increased the money, and presumably the opportunities to regulate, available to
states.
The question now arises why we need the deduction to accomplish that goal. It seems
like we could well get to the same bottom line simply by cutting federal taxes across the board.
Assuming that some localities have a preference for the level of combined services delivered by
the federal and state governments before, they ought to respond by raising their own taxes to
make up for the diminished federal demands and deliveries. Indeed, as I sketched before, it’s
quite likely that many taxpayers prefer locally-delivered services to nationalized services. So
they should, if anything, be happy to take up federal slack with state wind.
Research by tax scholars and psychologists suggests, however, that things are rarely so
clear-cut.60 In some experiments, voters were unlikely to treat different groups of taxes with
identical incidence as a single interchangeable mental category, “tax.”61 That results is contrary
to our initial assumption that taxpayers are likely indifferent to different allocations between
federal and state taxes in their overall tax burden. Study participants were similarly unlikely to
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be able to keep together in their mind taxes with the benefits those taxes bought, a phenomenon
the researchers dubbed the “isolation effect” or the “disaggregation bias.”62 The real-world
prediction that flows from these effects is that voters will be discontent about decreased federal
services, but also hostile to higher state taxes. That is, taxpayers will fail to put together the fact
that their taxes and services have shifted from the federal level to the state level; they will more
likely notice, and be angry at, higher state taxes and lower federal services. That is especially
likely if state taxes are highly “salient,” or imposed in a form very noticeable by the taxpayers.
Thus, they may resist new state taxes, even if to pay for services shifted from the federal level.
So federal tax cuts may simply lead to smaller government, even if the actual preference of the
electorate is for more regulation.63
The deduction responds to this type of problem by tying any decrease in federal tax levels
to higher state tax levels.64 Of course, the effectiveness of the deduction itself is probably also
limited by the isolation effect. The deduction will likely not be fully effective at lessening the
sting of higher state taxes, because many taxpayers won’t associate their higher state bill with the
lower federal bill. But, unlike any effort to use the deduction to force state and federal tax bases
to overlap, a purely devolutionary deduction can also make use of the disaggregation bias. To
maximize the usefulness of the deduction, the federal government could allow the deduction to
recognize as wide a variety of state taxes as the States can invent. By spreading out its tax
burden over many small taxes, each with its blow somewhat cushioned by a federal deduction,
the state might rather reduce the salience of its tax burden.65 That, in turn, may make it feasible
62
63
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that the decline in federal revenue will actually be matched by a corresponding expansion of state
proceeds.
The attentive reader no doubt has noticed that I have sprinkled this discussion with
qualifiers. I confess that many of my conclusions, such as they are, turn on the actual
psychological effects of differently structured tax regimes. They are, in other words, guesses.
More empirical work in these areas may give us more confidence in the accuracy of our guesses.
For now, though, it looks as though a purely devolutionary-targeted deduction could conceivably
be somewhat effective, especially if it allows taxpayers to claim a wide variety of state taxes.
Even so, that leaves us again with the question of de-biasing. The deduction here seems
both to respond to and also trade in the fact of taxpayer misconceptions. It seems unwise, and
perhaps even illegitimate, to make social policy whose basis depends on ignorance or
misunderstanding. If we are committed to devolution, then, the better route might be to educate
voters, not to manipulate their perceptions.66 Thus, there is another front for more and better
empirical work: how can we make de-biasing work, and can we make it work at a cost of less
than the deduction’s $75 billion sticker?
C. Spillovers
There is one last aspect of the state subsidy view we haven’t yet considered. Local
spending, we’ve seen, can serve not only residents of the locality but also their neighbors. The
present wisdom is that each such locality is under-motivated to produce these kinds of
“spillover” benefits.67 Supposedly, states do not internalize the gains their spending provides to
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others.68 If that is true, then they will have no particular incentive to allocate their resources in a
way that people who reside outside their own borders can enjoy.69 The deduction, in this view,
might make up for what would otherwise be an under-production of good spillovers.70 Of course,
there are some administrative challenges in making sure that the deduction is cost-effective (for
example, in targeting it to jurisdictions that benefit their neighbors the most), but these perhaps
are not insuperable. The larger difficulty for this theory, I suggest here, is that it is wrong that
states don’t internalize the benefits of the spillovers they produce. In particular, states can use
spillovers as a way of bribing non-residents not to move in, which can benefit the state in two
distinct ways.
1. The Benefits of Bribery
The first benefit to states flows from the fact that in a nation where interstate movement is
inefficient, states can in theory export some of their tax burden.71 To see how this works, start
with a model where there are no frictions. To take a simple example, sales taxes are a classic
way that a state can pay for some of its services with money supplied by outsiders – tourists and
other short-term visitors – who consume relatively little in the way of some services, such as
education and health care.72 Hotel taxes are an especially good example, since they generally
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affect the state’s own residents only indirectly.73 But in a frictionless republic, the sales-tax
state’s citizens wouldn’t be able to realize the benefits of exporting their tax.74 The hotel-tax
state is a bargain relative to its neighbors, so that their citizens now move into the state, driving
up the cost of real estate and driving down wages.75
The hotel-tax state has two main options in the frictionless republic, neither very likely to
succeed in allowing it to export its tax burden. First, it can simply pay a cash bribe to
prospective immigrants to stay home.76 Since the transaction costs of direct bargaining are likely
to be immense, it would have to use some central authority to distribute its bribes; the federal
government seems like a fine candidate. But even if transaction costs can be minimized, bribery
shouldn’t really work, because no rational, fully-informed carpet-bagger will accept a bribe of
less than the value of the bargain she’d be getting in good old HTS. The state might also try
another form of bribery – producing its services in a way that can also be used relatively
costlessly by the neighbors who are bearing its tax burden. Again, though, that doesn’t quite
work. Having a clean, accessible, and safe vacation spot next door, filled with well-educated
potential employees, is dandy. But, all else being equal, it isn’t as good as living there.
Frictions make bribery and deception viable strategies. If the benefit of living in Hotel
Tax City is $100, and it costs $50 to move there, a successful bribe obviously costs only $50,
which may make Hotel Tax City’s tax-exporting scheme economically viable. Of far greater
significance, though, is the fact that prospective immigrants probably cannot easily get an
accurate estimate of the value of living in HTC, will tend to overvalue their own entitlements,
73
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will have difficulty integrating the tax and benefit components of HTC’s financing, and so on.
Thus, even in a two-jurisdiction model, in which bundling problems are nonexistent and decision
costs are relatively low, a successful bribe probably could be priced at considerably below the per
capita fiscal advantage of tax exporting. That is crucial for larger models, in which the number
of prospective immigrants widens far beyond the small group of neighbors on whom a
jurisdiction is able to impose its own costs. The bribery story seems even more plausible if we
think that moving and information-gathering costs increase with distance, so that even as the
circle of jurisdictions laden with potential newcomers widens, the bribe necessary to keep them
at bay diminishes.77
In addition to permitting tax exporting, spillovers enable a state to provide services to its
citizens without also having to pay for free-riders. Any jurisdiction that offers public services
will be likely to attract migrants. Migrants may be from lower-tax jurisdictions, or they may
simply be late-comers who want to enjoy the fruit of the state’s earlier investments in developing
the capacity and know-how to deliver a given service.78 One way the state can fend off the
newcomers is to bribe them to stay at home. And one way of offering a bribe is for the state to
deliver its services in a way that the would-be immigrant can enjoy without moving in. In a
frictionless world, of course, that would not result in any gains for the service-providing state;
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bribes would have to equal the benefits of residency.79 But our nation is not so slippery as that.
Moving is expensive, information about where and when to move is costly, and citizens often
overvalue what they have relative to what they might get.80
Thus, producing some spillover benefits for neighboring jurisdictions in turn can produce
yet larger gains for the spilling state.
2. Why Not Zoning?
It might be argued, though, that states do not actually use bribes, because bribes are an
inferior tool for achieving the same ends that could be accomplished through restrictive zoning.
Localities can use zoning to force potential newcomers to consume more housing than they could
afford, and to pay enough property tax to cover any services they might consume.81 Here,
though, we see a significant difference between state and local incentives: The States, at least at
present, do not zone.82 So bribery is a significant factor in state-level fiscal decisions.
At the local level, many jurisdictions cannot effectively employ restrictive zoning.
Because exclusive zoning depends on restricting the number of people who can occupy a lot of
land, it is not useful in wealthy but already-densely populated areas, such as Manhattan or San
Francisco. In other regions exclusive zoning is unlawful or restricted by judicial supervision.
Although would-be migrants don’t have standing in federal court to challenge exclusive zoning
in a jurisdiction where they don’t reside,83 a zoning jurisdiction must run the risk that its state
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will take a broader view of the rights cognizable in state court.84 Further, zoning is not effective
at shifting costs onto neighbors who can afford to respond by moving into the would-be exporter.
Exclusive zoning also has social costs, such as lost diversity, that some jurisdictions may
recognize as significant.85 Finally, it may be that bribery is cost-effective even in addition to
exclusive zoning.
***
In short, there looks to be little reason to think that states need to be encouraged to
generate spillover benefits. A good number of localities, too, are likely to internalize many of the
benefits of spillovers, because exclusive zoning is not a fully effective alternative. It isn’t clear
that we would be able to, or want to, sort out those that needed further encouragement. Indeed,
the fact that the deduction facilitates spillovers should give us some hesitation about the
deduction generally, since it might, in turn, also grease the skids for tax exporting.
D. Why Not Direct Spending?
From this sketch, it doesn’t look like any of these three possible tax subsidy arguments is
particularly overwhelming. But suppose we thought one or more of them was reasonably
persuasive. We might then ask, with Professor Kaplow, why bother with taxes at all? Kaplow
argues that direct federal grants to the States could serve the same ends as the deduction without
some of the attendant distortions.86 Obviously, the debate over using the tax system for policy
objectives is a subject much larger than I can do justice to here. An abbreviated glance, however,
84
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suggests at least some potential role for deductions alongside direct expenditures.
Perhaps Kaplow’s most trenchant argument is his claim that direct grants would allow for
more accountability on the part of state officials who take receipt of the grant moneys and decide
how to spend.87 He may be thinking of the many strings, including judicial oversight, that often
come with federal grants. But, again, assuming that is an attractive approach, it is at least
conceivable to design a similar structure around tax expenditures.88 Consider two tax longstanding tax expenditures: the charitable deduction and exemptions, centered around section 501
of the Code, and the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit.89 Both offer potential models for how
favorable tax treatment can mimic the accountability and transparency of direct spending
programs. Under both programs, the IRS actively monitors the behavior of recipients. While not
all the results of the IRS’s enforcement activities are made public, the process of complying with
IRS mandates produces vast amounts of public information, such as the Forms 1023 prepared by
entities applying for exempt status and annual Form 990 returns filed by those entities. These
forms are now collected on-line,90 and offer taxpayers -- as well as prospective donors or
business partners -- a window into the finances, charitable objectives, and internal governance
structures of various charities. At the same time, the IRS is not alone in its enforcement and
monitoring efforts. Under both programs, the IRS draws significantly on the expertise and eyes
87
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of regulatory partners -- state attorneys general in the case of exempt entities, and HUD and state
housing finance agencies in the case of the LIHTC.
The analogy to exempt entities suggests another possible strength of subsidizing states
with tax deductions rather than grants: the size of the subsidy is dictated by market decisions,
rather than by Congress. Recall that one of the premises of the state-subsidy rationale was that it
helped to restore to states the political autonomy to set their own fiscal policy, a freedom
somewhat compromised by collective action problems. That goal seems incompatible with direct
subsidies: If the federal government collects the revenues on the States’ behalf, how does it
know what allocation of funds would duplicate what would have been the states’ original
preferences? Once the money is collected the individual states are unlikely to claim that they are
uninterested in distributing it to their citizens; no one turns down free money. 91 One possibility is
that we could allocate federal money according to the extent to which states actually redistribute
their own money, much as the charitable deduction in effect rewards charities in proportion to the
amount of public support they can garner.92 The current deduction superficially seems to do just
that, since it rewards states in proportion to the extent to which they impose their tax burden on
wealthy itemizers.
There is a problem with this argument, though. State tax revenues speak only to the
intake side of the balance sheet; we don’t know what states do with the money they raise.93 It
seems fairly plausible that they shift both taxes and services to high earners. That is, although
states may tax more heavily because of the deduction, they might not redistribute the tax income
91
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in the way they would have preferred absent collective action barriers. Professor Stark argues to
the contrary, claiming that many state constitutions require some equity in education
expenditures, and noting that the U.S. Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race,
thereby putatively limiting a state’s ability to channel its tax dollars to selected groups.94
With due respect to Professor Stark, these are unconvincing arguments. Federal
constitutional scrutiny of class-based state spending is minimal,95 and is not heightened by the
fact that class differences may overlap with racial differences.96 Notably, the Supreme Court has
upheld large disparities in state allocations of education spending.97 State constitutional rulings
have largely set minimum standards for all school districts without capping what wealthier
districts can spend on themselves.98 And there are few, if any, limits anywhere on how a locality
can allocate its money for jobs, policing, parks, clean streets, or filled potholes, or how it chooses
between services with obvious distributive implications, such as highways versus public transit,
workplace safety and health inspectors versus securities regulators.99 Moreover, to the extent that
jurisdictions may want to discourage free-riding by indigent newcomers, the jurisdictions have an
incentive to allocate service dollars in ways that will benefit those with more wealth.
So allocation has no obvious workable shortcut, and it is a serious conceptual problem.
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The deduction seems an attractive alternative to grants if its goal is to restore spending discretion
-- and therefore political autonomy -- to states hamstrung by collective action problems. But it
appears clear that any distribution of money for redistribution will be according to a federal
formula highly unlikely to capture the actual preferences of each state.
Another criticism of the deduction is that it may not be a particularly efficient tool for
delivering money to state governments.100 Unlike a simple grant, the deduction does not
necessarily deliver money to states on a dollar-for-dollar basis; instead, it relies on some alchemy
of the political views of deduction recipients and responses by state officials. The perceived
after-federal-tax cost of a state tax to a state voter may be hard to calculate, especially in light of
possible federal changes. This uncertainty arguably reduces the value of the deduction in a way
that cash in hand certainly does not. However, the deduction might also actually buoy federal
revenues. Remember that the deduction, especially in its current form, is most valuable to highincome states. At the moment, most of the highest-earning states are net federal tax exporters.101
The deduction counter-balances that disparity (hence, the support of Mario Cuomo).102 And the
federal income tax is considerably more salient than most federal expenditures, especially for
higher-wage earners who don’t receive Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, or AFDC benefits.
So the deduction could make voters in these net-payer states more willing to shoulder their high
combined tax burden. Cognitive biases, in short, might allow the deduction to do much more
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work in facilitating federal spending than its pure dollar value.103 But it could well also leverage
much less. More data undoubtedly would be welcome here. We do know, though, that
cooperative spending programs are not 100% efficient, either, since they entail significant
bureaucratic costs. So it isn’t clear at the moment that the deduction is a comparatively
inefficient way of delivering federal monies.
On the other hand, it seems as though there ought to be room for both grants and tax
expenditures as tools of federal subsidy. As we’ve seen, it probably is politically very difficult to
remove a large deduction, enjoyed by politically powerful wealthy taxpayers, from the federal
income tax. At least some benefits financed through direct expenditure are not comparably
resilient. Thus, tax subsidies can be rather more stable than direct spending.104 That stability
obviously makes planning and reliance easier for those affected by the federal program. Further,
stability can save the federal government money. I’ve noted elsewhere that a prospective
regulatory partner contemplating working together with the federal government in exchange for
financial gain is likely to demand a premium for uncertainty.105 Changes in federal policy may
lock the partner in to continuing a course that, while unprofitable, is less disadvantageous than
abandoning sunk investments and starting over.106 The rational partner wants to be paid against
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the possibility of that outcome.107 A more reliable federal promise, such as policies enacted
through the tax system might carry, can make the uncertainty premium lower. In some
circumstances these planning benefits and cost savings should make the deduction an attractive
alternative to grants, even if somewhat less efficient.
III. No Exit?
And so it appears that the deduction is not without some appeal as a tool for facilitating
state spending. But is the deduction money well spent? I’ve implied several times that the
deduction may also affect state governance itself. In this section I argue, apparently for the first
time in the literature, that the deduction may well be expanding state government at the same
time it is undermining state government’s effectiveness. But I also acknowledge that there is
some hope we can make the deduction more amenable to federalism and localism, by making it a
useful component of a broader system to reform some of the structural problems that plague
governance by many parallel, competing jurisdictions.
These questions about the quality of state governance arise because the deduction
significantly curtails interstate movement. For example, an individual taxpayer is considerably
less likely to move in order to escape subjectively burdensome taxes if she perceives the
deduction as lightening her burden,108 especially if moving would be costly and somewhat risky.
More generally, by shifting some revenue from the federal government to the states, the
deduction may damper interstate movement by encouraging localized investment. Although
federalism provides many different baskets of taxes and services, it paradoxically makes it harder
to choose among the baskets, and greatly magnifies the costs of ascertaining what each one
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contains.109 If all spending were national, each taxpayer would know that in moving from one
state to another she would be getting, roughly speaking, the same basket, and wouldn’t have to
research thousands of alternatives, compare them, and decide between them before moving.
Many commentators would claim that this diminished mobility will significantly reduce
the efficiency of state government.110 In an ideal market, taxpayers will flee inefficient or corrupt
governments for those who deliver similar sets of services with less waste.111 Some writers
predict that even in a more realistic model, in which we recognize that there are significant
frictions on interjurisdictional movement, intrastate politics can be shaped by the threat of exit.112
An important taxpayer doesn’t have to actually analyze all the costs and benefits of every
possible other jurisdiction in order to claim credibly she will leave.113 All she has to do is find
one other jurisdiction that delivers one service more efficiently than her current home. The
government of her home state doesn’t know that she hasn’t analyzed all the other factors; for all
it knows, she’s indifferent to them. Indeed, politicians have a professional interest in
understanding human nature, so that our taxpayer’s elected officials may guess that she might be
109
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motivated more by heuristics than detailed cost analysis. These officials have a strong incentive
to satisfy the powerful taxpayer, because although her one vote may not be very important, her
departure (and, of course, her campaign contributions) would be: the lost revenue would hurt the
state in ways that would cost the officials more votes, and other citizens may look to her as an
opinion leader.114 When all the wealthy families leave (or threaten to leave) a neighborhood, few
of the residents who remain are likely to conclude that the government has been doing a good job
recently.115 So, again, exit can be an important mechanism in chastening local governments,
even if no one actually ever goes anywhere.
To this familiar argument I would add that mobility can also foster a form of taxpayer
participation in government by curbing tax exporting. For the most part, we have no right to
participate in the politics of a jurisdiction where we don’t reside, even if it makes decisions that
affect us, such as by instituting a tax whose incidence we bear.116 But as I’ve mentioned, we can
force the exporting jurisdiction to take some consideration for us simply by the threat of moving
there in response.117 That threat may even give rise to negotiations between exporter and
nonresident over what bribe the exporter must pay to prevent in-migration.
It therefore is possible that the deduction undermines the efficiency and participatory
character of state and local government. The deduction diminishes the chastening force of exit,
undercuts the force of threats to depart, and weakens incentives for jurisdictions to pay heed to
the needs of neighbors affected by their policies. These effects are particularly troubling if our
main rationale for the deduction was precisely in order to expand the range of services offered by
114
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local governments.
However, as the tax exporting example also suggested, mobility and exit also create
incentives for state governments that might cut against good government. The premise of the
efficient exit argument is that state government must be relatively transparent, so that mobile
citizens can recognize inefficiencies and move to avoid them or threaten to move if they aren’t
repaired.118 The trouble is that in order to frustrate migration, both in and out, states may prefer
to make the quality and kind of their services as opaque as possible. Of course, individual
officials will always want to be able to campaign on demonstrable successes. But, in the absence
of any benchmark for what constitutes “success,” and faced with substantial obstacles to
acquiring that information, the average voter will have no way of assessing claims by local
officials that they have far outstripped their neighbors.119 And the government can always deliver
essentially secret benefits – through zoning variances, property tax waivers, special regulatory
rulings, and other highly opaque avenues -- to important constituencies.
One might argue, on the other hand, that jurisdictions should have an incentive to offer
good comparative data in order to entice wealthy newcomers. If losing successful residents hurts
officials’ prospects for reelection, attracting prominent new ones should help. Admittedly, this
information will be limited. Since the jurisdiction will want to attract only the wealthy, it is
likely to compile only data about services that would be attractive to that group, and not about,
say, transfer payments. Information may be screened in a way to keep it from those with modest
means, such as by disclosing exclusively through realtors or the local Chamber of Commerce,
and/or by imposing a small charge for access. Moreover, information disclosure may not be
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effective at attracting outsiders. Prospective migrants don’t know how long the transparent phase
of government will last.120 They may reasonably calculate that the jurisdiction doesn’t want them
to leave, and the potential inflow of less beneficial taxpayers may at some point outweigh the
gains of continued openness, so that the taxpayers enticed by the possibility of open and efficient
government will be stranded again. If that attitude proves widespread there might never be a
strong reason for the jurisdiction to provide good data in the first place. So exit produces only
somewhat modest incentives for transparency, and even then only for some sorts of services.
The deduction doesn’t help matters, and in fact likely makes information problems worse.
Recall that the deduction has little effect on the mobility of low-income taxpayers. As we saw, a
major reason states attempt to occlude the kind and quality of services they provide is in order to
exclude those low-income taxpayers. Thus, even though the deduction reduces some kinds of
exit, and exit in general creates an incentive for opaque government, the deduction does little to
stem a locality’s desire to obscure. The deduction does, though, reduce the mobility of highincome taxpayers. That would make it harder for states to attract these high-earners through
transparency. The result is that the deduction actually diminishes any incentive for jurisdictions
to generate good information about themselves.
There is a bit of a bright side, though. Mobility may also damage local government in
two other fairly well-known ways. First, it will tend to undermine the possibility that each
locality will develop into a strongly connected community of principle, in which the residents
understand each other’s needs and values and set policy after debate about issues of shared
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importance.121 Relatedly, the likelihood of frequent relocation may tend to lead voters to make
political decisions based on short-term needs rather than the long-term interests of the
community as a whole.122 To the extent that it reduces exit, the deduction helps preserve these
two values.
On the whole, though, it looks doubtful that mixing the deduction with unmediated, freemarket federalism will lead to salutary developments in state governance. One response to this
situation would be to shift regulation to the federal government.123 But, obviously, that would
often come at the expense of the experimentation and diversity benefits that accompany
independent local lawmaking. So at this point the deduction looks like a very bad choice if our
goal is to encourage devolution or local redistribution, and its negative effects on local
governance are surely a concern if we want to improve the equity of the federal tax base or
achieve societal tax-enforcement savings.
Over the last decade, however, a number of commentators have suggested tactics for
reforming federalism so as to cure some of the pathologies of it in its free-market form. These
proposals combine federal and state regulation, sometimes along with direct popular
participation, in an effort to gain the best of both worlds.124 The federal government in these
121
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schemes serves as a sort of clearing house and analyst for good governmental practices.125 For
each policy, a federal agency sets out broad goals, which states then may pursue through their
own means, but with technical and in some cases financial assistance from the feds.126 As state
regulators on the ground gather information about the nature of the problem and how to address
it, they feed that information back to the agency, which collects the data and rates the states
according to rolling sets of standards that are themselves revised in response to the developing
set of information.127 “Consumers” of the regulatory product – in other words, voters – then put
pressure on their local government to meet the standards achieved by other jurisdictions.128
Citizens can also participate throughout all levels of the project,129 and may serve as an additional
force for transparency by exposing efforts by inside players to game the system.130 The result, in
theory, is a system that is at once open and responsive to public input but also flexible, that
involves localized communities of principle but that submits their conclusions to comparison
against a wide variety of other viewpoints.131
Exit and the threat of exit are still a problem for these collaborative systems, however. In
essence, collaboration faces a familiar trade-off between “voice” and “exit.”132 The collaborative
design depends significantly on active, well-informed members of each community who will
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help implement each program, provide vital ground-level data, check groupthink or self-dealing
by insiders, and, most significantly, study how their locality performs relative to others and
demand that it match the benchmarks set by others.133 But all of that is time-consuming and
costly. At the same time, in the collaborative system, information is very cheap (because it is
gathered by the federal government) and usually rendered in a way that is designed to facilitate
comparisons.134 That relieves one of the major frictions on interstate movement. So in many
cases it will be more attractive simply to move to one of the better jurisdictions than to stay home
and fix what’s wrong. And that possibility, in turn, may make some localities, especially those
who expect that they may initially lag others, reluctant even to participate in a collaborative
project, or more likely to game it and hide their results if they must take part to get federal funds
or other benefits.135 If the most attentive citizens have already left, a weasely local government
puts a lot of pressure on federal regulators to require real transparency,136 a relationship
somewhat at odds with the system’s object of reducing adversarial relationships between central
and local regulators.
Cooperative theorists, recognizing this difficulty, argue that the threat of exit, again, is an
effective second-best alternative to actual exit. In a highly transparent system, threats of exit by
opinion-leaders or revenue-generating taxpayers will be even more credible, and therefore
magnify the responsiveness of local governments to the pressure of citizen scrutiny and
comparison to national benchmarks.137 Additionally, secret payments to these groups might be a
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bit harder. Although this view explains why the possibility of exit can enhance local
government, it does not seem completely to address whether exit itself might be damaging.
Thus the problem, I think, is in equilibrating the gains of the threat of exit against the
perils of actual brain drain. There is an obvious analogy here to debates over voucher systems,
both in education and in subsidized housing. Portable subsidies put pressure on the service
provider to keep its mobile customers.138 But there is a certain point at which mobility might
deprive a foundering school system or housing project of those engaged and capable enough both
to recognize peril or to remedy it, and leave the rest behind in a system that may be beyond repair
without the aid of those who have departed.139 The risks in those two situations seem at least to
this writer large enough to be attractive only at last resort. The difference in collaborative
systems is that we have other choices. Again, collaborative systems, it is thought, enhance the
“voice” of local citizens by involving them directly in regulation, and providing them with lowcost access to information they can employ in the political process.140 While the threat of exit
might further amplify that voice, it carries too the risks I’ve just mentioned. In some situations
the risk that exit will collapse a locality instead of helping to reshape it may be very serious, and
perhaps hard to predict beforehand. In those instances we might prefer collaboration with
relatively little possibility of exit.
It is possible that the deduction could help to create a low-exit collaborative environment.
As we’ve seen, the deduction blunts the impact of citizen mobility without eliminating it. In the
context of a collaborative system, we could view the deduction as a payment to well-informed
138
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citizens who might be tempted to leave to stay and lobby within their existing system rather than
fleeing it.141 Thus, it may help assure that efforts to govern transparently and collaboratively can
actually achieve that end.
In short, although the deduction may have an uncertain or even negative effect on state
government at present, it may also serve some role in mitigating the risks of hypothesized
reformed systems of collaborative federal-state regulation.
IV. An Enforcement Expenditure?
What we’ve seen so far raises some questions about whether section 164 makes sense as
a tax expenditure. Here, though, I want to suggest another possible goal of the deduction as tax
expenditure, one that, to my knowledge, has not previously been suggested either in the
economic or legal literature. The deduction, I argue, may facilitate socially useful efficiency
gains by allowing states to free-ride on federal tax enforcement efforts.142
The enforcement argument rests on three basic premises. First, it posits that tax
enforcement is expensive and difficult, but can easily be centralized at some savings if different
jurisdictions generally tax the same income base. Next, it claims that notwithstanding this
benefit states will ordinarily be somewhat inclined against taxing the same base taxed by the
federal government, among other reasons because political resistance to a single high tax is more
substantial than resistance to several equivalent small taxes. Finally, it suggests that the
deduction, by mitigating this effect, can induce states to shift their taxes to the base taxed and
policed by the federal government.
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A. The Benefits of Overlapping Enforcement
Effective tax enforcement is not cheap.143 More importantly for my purposes, it comes
with very substantial overhead costs. An enforcing jurisdiction must develop or recruit a team of
expert investigators, analysts, auditors, and lawyers, many of whom must be conversant not only
in the substantive tax law of the jurisdiction but also in the very numerous ways that wealth or
revenue may be invested, transported, exchanged, and concealed. That challenge has grown
exponentially with the rise of international markets for capital and the development of overseas
tax havens designed to make it easy to conceal ownership of property.144 The international aspect
of tax enforcement also means that it is not enough for states to be able to track and understand
transnational financial transactions; often, the enforcing jurisdiction will also have to have some
agreement with the foreign state in order to obtain any information from it at all. In the case of
tax havens, securing such an agreement can be a matter of some delicacy – or, perhaps, one
calling for some significant bluster.
As I’ve suggested, states can relatively easily economize on these costs by relying in
some measure on the federal government.145 Commentators on international tax arbitrage have
already observed that foreign states may themselves depend on the IRS, with its relatively
sophisticated information gathering, computer data analysis, and web of treaties, to collect
information about the flow of international capital.146 The same is surely true of our 50 states.
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The feds have more leverage – such as, in extreme cases, the threat of tariffs – to extract
agreements from tax havens.147 And relying on federal enforcement efforts can save not only
these sorts of overhead costs, but also the year-to-year costs of auditing and litigating.148 It is
relatively costless for the IRS, once it has detected that a taxpayer has failed to declare income
from her Cayman real estate trust, to turn that data over to state authorities.149 Federal authorities
can even punish noncompliant taxpayers for violating state law; for example, some federal courts
have held that a sentencing court can enhance a tax offender’s sentence based on the combined
total of state and federal taxes evaded.150 Thus, the threat of federal enforcement also greatly
supplements the deterrent effect of individual state enforcement efforts, leading to higher
compliance even in cases where there is no investigation by anyone.
Therefore, overlapping enforcement is an attractive goal for the tax system, since it would
eliminate inefficient duplication of overhead expenses across the nation. For small jurisdictions,
overhead may be so large that cooperative enforcement is the only realistic alternative.151
Overlap is therefore important even to jurisdictions willing to pay their own way, because the
existence of another state where enforcement is known to be lax would be a sort of domestic tax
haven, luring capital and other loophole-seekers.
It seems fairly clear, though, that to a significant extent these benefits are only available if
state and federal tax bases overlap. A state that derives its income from a sales tax collected at
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retailer’s registers has relatively little to gain from careful federal auditing of individual income
tax returns. It will spend lots of money auditing the books of its retailers (and, probably, their
suppliers, as well), though.
Another benefit states can realize with overlapping tax bases is simplification. A state
with few disparities between its own tax system and the federal system can attract capital with
the promise of lower tax planning expenses.152 Although it may make accountants unhappy, that
strategy obviously is considerably less burdensome for ordinary taxpayers.153
As a result, we may well want to encourage states to rest a fair portion of their tax burden
on a base already taxed and scrutinized by the federal government. The list for individuals at
present is fairly short – income taxes, estate taxes, and some excises. That would transfer
substantial wealth to the states, reduce tax planning costs to citizens, and prevent a serious
potential source of interstate capital leakage. But, one might ask, if overlapping tax bases is so
great, why should we need to pay states to do it?
B. Obstacles
It turns out there are a number of good answers to our last question, some of them
theoretical, others a matter of practical politics. I’ll begin with what I think is the simplest, the
distortionary effects of taxation. Taxes, of course, affect behavior – thus the entire notion of the
tax expenditure. Not all of these effects are socially desirable. For instance, depending on how a

152

See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 25, at 273; Super, supra note 106, at 2594.
Shaviro, supra note 7, at 910, 919; see Fox & Murray, supra note 144, at 291. On the other hand, as we saw in
Part III, we should remember that the state in so doing also makes it easier for out-of-state residents to evaluate the
costs and benefits of living there, which may tend to attract free-riders or facilitate the flight of current residents
unhappy with that balance.
Another potential effect of shared enforcement is that, as states all converge towards the federal base, they
also converge towards one another. See Fox & Murray, supra note 144, at 291. This Article is agnostic about
whether that is a desirable end; Professor Shaviro has already examined the trade-offs thoroughly. See generally
Shaviro, supra note 7.
153

43

tax system treats the income of married couples, a progressive rate structure coupled with no
imputed income from household work may tend to cause potential married part-time or low-wage
earners to stay home.154 Those effects are magnified if two jurisdictions tax the same sets of
income in similar ways. The deduction, however, blunts the incentive effects of state taxation by
repaying the state taxpayer a significant percentage (his federal marginal rate) of the state tax.
We could thus view the deduction as a way of permitting double taxation with somewhat
lessened distortive effects.
One irony here is that some tax incentive effects are desirable – again, that’s the whole
point of a tax expenditure. The deduction therefore may make it more difficult for states to
achieve policy objectives through higher taxes on select behavior.155 That may not be especially
troublesome from a federal perspective; it helps to prevent states from constructing tax incentives
that work at cross-purposes with federal goals. But, obviously, it may reduce the appeal of
overlapping tax bases for the states.
Another theoretical problem the deduction may not entirely solve is the increased risk to a
state’s fiscal condition that can come with taxing the same base as the federal government.
Suppose most state revenues come either from federal subsidies or state taxes. In the event of an
economic downturn that depresses federal revenues, the federal subsidy portion of the state’s
budget will likely decline. If the state is depending on the same source of revenue, its tax
revenues, too, will be hit hard by the downturn. A diversified tax base, like a diversified
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investment portfolio, could help the state avoid some of that risk. It is unclear that the deduction
does much to replace the benefits of diversification. In the event of a fiscal squeeze, the
deduction still comes out of the same tightening federal budget the state was depending on for
other forms of subsidy, so that adjusting state taxes to draw more federal cash through the
deduction will only reduce other federal contributions.
Turning to more worldly political considerations, a potential downside for state
politicians in tying their own tax system to the federal system is that that link may also bind their
political fortunes to federal policy.156 The 2002 and 2003 tax bills plunged not only federal but
also many state tax receipts deep into the red, because many states explicitly tie their income and
estate tax calculations to federal methods.157 Unfortunately for state office-holders, many of
those states have balanced-budget provisions in their constitutions, or are subject to harsh
discipline from financial markets and other political pressures, so that the legislatures did not
have the luxury of borrowing.158 They got to raise taxes and cut services, instead, which naturally
endeared them to their constituents.159 Of course, it is possible to tax roughly the federal base
without expressly mirroring federal provisions. That approach, though, sacrifices many of the
benefits of simplification – which is especially significant in a competitive world if other states
are simpler – and in some cases may produce a somewhat different base. For instance, many

156

Cf. Shaviro, supra note 7, at 926, 958--59 (arguing that local governments may have incentive to diverge from
federal tax system in order to maintain “their own power and function”). I am grateful to Martin Ginsburg for
making this point.
157
Timothy Catts, President’s Tax Cuts Take a Bite Out of State Budgets, 100 TAX NOTES 1098, 1098 (2003); Iris J.
Lav & Andrew Brecher, Passing Down the Deficit: Federal Policies Contribute to the Severity of the State Fiscal
Crisis 2, 3 (Aug. 18, 2004), available at <www.cbpp.org/5-12-04sfp.pdf>.
158
Briffault, supra note 45, at 548, 554--55; Super, supra note 106, at 2255, 2592.
159
John M. Broder, Despite Signs of Economic Recovery, States’ Budgets are Still Reeling, THE NEW YORK TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2005, at A1; Isaac Shapiro & Nicholas Johnson, Total Revenues from All Levels of Government Drops to
Lowest Share of Economy Since 1968, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 16, 2004, at 11.

45

states tax estates the federal government leaves unscathed,160and, more significantly for present
purposes, many estates it leaves unaudited. So getting the main benefits of overlap probably
entails some political risk. The deduction can help somewhat here, in that it may soften the blow
if a state is forced to raise its rates in response to enactment of new federal deductions.
The most significant obstacle to overlapping tax bases, however, is the political economy
of taxing a single base at a much higher combined rate. A diversified set of state taxes has the
advantage that each tax may have a somewhat distinctive incidence, so that the collective
burdens of the tax are spread across different subsets of the state population (or outsiders). If the
state shifts its base to match the federal base, it is concentrating the tax burden on that particular
group of taxpayers, a group already targeted by the federal government, as well. Perhaps
counterintuitively, this narrowing of the tax base may actually increase political resistance to the
state tax, even though it may now be concentrated on fewer voters.161 That is because politics
often depends not only on the numerosity of voters but also the intensity of their engagement in
the political process.162 Engaged citizens will likely follow issues closely, be more likely to vote
based on their issue, lobby others, and, crucially, contribute money to support their position.163
Because of collective action problems, a tax that lands heavily on a smaller, easily-identified
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group will typically face more opposition than a fiscally equivalent service cut that affects only
slightly a large, diverse segment of the population.164
This effect is exaggerated by the fact that the particular federal tax we’d be encouraging
states to adopt, the income tax, is among the most visible. Researchers have suggested that
because of a bias known as the “availability” heuristic, taxpayers prefer hidden, or less “salient”
taxes to those whose incidence is obvious and well-known to the payors.165 Of course, it’s not
that the taxpayers really “prefer” hidden taxes; it’s simply that they don’t oppose them as much.
The income tax, in these surveys, is usually among the most salient, and therefore least
popular.166 We all know who pays our income tax bill. That increased awareness likely lowers
the threshold for activating potential voters, and makes it easier for them to find like-minded
opponents.
Interestingly, the bias against salient taxes implies that shifting state revenues to an
income tax will increase political opposition even if the shift does not change the actual
incidence of state taxes. That is, even if the same taxpayers bear identical proportional burdens
under state sales, property, and income taxes, shifting to the income tax with no net change in
state revenue will make state taxes less popular. That is one reason researchers have deemed
salience a “cognitive bias”; it seems to have bite even when the change in incidence is a fiscal
illusion.167
A similar problem is suggested by research showing that taxpayers will support a higher
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overall level of taxation through a constellation of small taxes than they will through a fiscally
identical single large tax. Professors McCaffery and Baron term this effect the “disaggregation”
bias.168 When evaluating any single tax, individuals tend to focus strongly on that tax without
being able to keep in mind its combined impact with other tax and spending policies.169 Thus,
each individual small tax looks acceptable, or in any event less unappealing than the single large
tax, so that the taxpayer is willing to accept a series of small bites that cumulate to as much or
more than the big one.170 As a result, depending on a state’s political climate, attempting to shift
from many disparate taxes to principle reliance on the income tax may not be revenue-neutral.
At first pass, then, the deduction looks like it might be an effective counterweight to these
problems of political economy. Especially in its current incarnation, the deduction rewards
disproportionately wealthy itemizers.171 But that is precisely the group – small, easily selfidentified, heavily impacted by higher state income-tax rates, and (as evidenced by the capacity
to itemize) relatively knowledgeable about tax – that would be most active in opposing higher
state income taxes. And, assuming state taxpayers can integrate the effect of a smaller federal tax
bill with the fact of a higher state tax bill, it might soften the impact of other taxpayer biases. But
that last assumption already looks shaky, considering what we’ve already seen of the
disaggregation bias.
It might also be argued that political effects cut, not against the state income tax, but
instead against an overlapping federal income tax. If the unwanted burden is the combination of
state and federal taxes, it may be that political resistance will be aimed at federal taxation rather
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than the smaller state piece.172 State taxpayers might rationally prefer to see taxing and spending
on the local level, where their voices are proportionately stronger and their control over
expenditures correspondingly more powerful.173 Self-interested voters might prefer to keep taxes
local because local expenditures might look more like services and less like transfer payments to
others.174 Even state programs identified expressly as “welfare” or transfer payments might be
seen as a way of purchasing insurance for the possibility of personal economic downturns. The
same program instituted nationally might look less like insurance because the taxpayer may
assume she is unlikely ever to be unemployed or without health insurance in the many distant
states where her tax dollars are now developing a service-delivery infrastructure.
These tendencies might also produce reinforcing cognitive biases, such as through the
“generalization effect.”175 Some research, for instance, suggests that individuals respond
negatively to taxation, but have less negative views about taxing for many specific programs.176
The exceptions are categories like foreign aid, which are obviously transfer payments.177 It is
possible that the tested individuals “generalize” their negative feelings about foreign aid to an
undifferentiated tax. Similarly, taxpayers might generalize from the negative aspects of national
taxation, to the point that they neglect some of the service benefits it provides them.
In this view, the deduction may actually be more useful to the federal government than to
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the States. State representatives should happily free ride on federal enforcement efforts, and let
their congressmen deal with the headache of political groundswells. The deduction could then be
a useful tactic for federal representatives to maintain support for existing revenue levels.
Obviously, if popular responses to tax levels were uniform and rational, it would be impossible
for the deduction to be cost-effective on that front. But again, the strongest and most energetic
political opposition is likely to come from exactly that group most benefitted by the current form
of the deduction. The feds may not have to pay off the large group of relatively inattentive
taxpayers who pay higher combined rates. More empirical research is needed, but it is possible
that the deduction could actually be, strangely, a political expenditure from the federal
government to itself.
C. Will It Float?
Suppose, though, that we are convinced that political economy impedes states’ ability to
rely on federal enforcement. How accurate is our first-glance take that the deduction might
mitigate the problem? Again, the answer on some level depends on empirical data we don’t have
right now.
Remember our tentative thought that the disaggregation bias might limit the effectiveness
of the deduction in taking the sting from state income taxes. The difficulty, again, is that when
state voters consider a ballot proposition, or evaluate the performance of a state politician, they
may tend to focus on the burden of the state tax alone, without considering the offsetting benefit
they receive on their federal return. On the other hand, many taxpayers file their state and federal
returns at the same time, so that they may be somewhat more likely to view the two as a whole.
These predictions may seem hard to square with other research, which shows that states
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generally do adjust their tax base to take advantage of available federal deductions.178 A problem
with relying on those studies for our purposes, though, is that during the period of the studies the
federal deduction allowed credits not only for the income tax but also property tax and, in some
studies, sales taxes.179 Thus, the taxpayers were getting a credit in a highly “salient” tax, the
federal income tax, and paying more in less salient state taxes. We can’t be sure whether states
were responding rationally to a straightforward subsidy offer or somewhat irrationally
substituting hidden taxes for a salient one, or some of both. As a result, the studies are only
weakly predictive of what would happen if we were to try to replace federal income taxes with
equally salient state income taxes. Also, the studies don’t seem to track how durable the
switches they document prove. It is possible that a well-informed, “rational” group of high-tax
payers might lobby for the state to change its base to capture the federal deduction, but that over
time the rest of the taxpayers would (irrationally) find the new tax so burdensome that they
would demand it be switched back.180
There are, though, two uses for the deduction that would seem not seriously threatened by
the possibility of fiscal illusion. One is its potential to soften the impact of tax base
consolidation on high-income taxpayers.181 A well-advised taxpayer is highly unlikely to
complain about a new tax structure that imposes 15% more state tax on her but gives her back
20%. The other is that if the deduction is actually a self-defense mechanism for federal
legislators, the disaggregation bias isn’t very important. Indeed, the disaggregation bias would
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help to make a discount on the federal tax bill mollify taxpayers, even if the discount is not as big
as the state bill that, in theory, would otherwise threaten to crowd out federal revenue.
***
In sum, it isn’t clear that we need the deduction in order to get the benefits of shared
federal and state tax enforcement. At the same time, it isn’t clear that we don’t. More work in
this field would be welcome. One thing that does seem reasonably clear, though, is that to the
extent enforcement is a justification for the deduction, it should extend only to sources of state
revenue that match the federal tax base. In our current system, that would mean keeping the
deduction for state income tax182 but scrapping deductions for sales and property taxes.
CONCLUSION
I do not want to overstate my conclusions. One thing I believe this analysis has shown
convincingly is that the merits of the deduction are complex, and may turn on facts we do not
now know. To tax ourselves we must know ourselves -- but our minds are still to us very
mysterious engines. To shape our institutions we must know them not only as they are now but
also as they properly ought to be, a question that tax policy alone cannot resolve.
Still, this Article contributes some promising new leads. I have shown that the project of
using deductions to shift spending to states and local governments is misguided to the extent that
it includes a simple federal handover of money to those governments. The deduction can
substantially erode the efficiency, transparency, and democratic character of sub-national
government. Thus, using the deduction to effect any shift to the States may seem almost cruelly
mistaken, to the point where one is inclined to wonder whether the whole enterprise isn’t simply
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an effort to produce government that is so unlovely that citizens prefer to eliminate it entirely.
But this Article also demonstrates entirely abandoning the deduction as a tool of fiscal
federalism would be short-sighted. For the deduction can also be a tool of government reform. It
can mitigate exit risks that might threaten experimentalist efforts to build collaboration between
states, private stakeholders, and the federal government. And its relative political stability, and
cognitive features, may make it more efficient than direct spending at nationalizing federal
policy.
If nothing else, the deduction has powerful effects on state tax policy. I have suggested
here a previously unrecognized goal for the deduction in shaping states’ tax policy: the
possibility of societal gains from overlapping tax enforcement also may establish a decent case
for some targeted deductions. While other potential benefits from greater state overlap with the
federal tax base, such as simplifying tax planning and compliance, have been treated before in
the literature, I add here that the deduction may be a mechanism for achieving those good ends.
However uncertain these beginnings, I think this Article is a success if it shows that
section 164 is about more than (boatloads of) money. The tax literature, while recognizing in
broad terms the significance of federalism for tax policy, has been slow to integrate the insights
of regulatory theory, which profoundly changes traditional ideas of federal-state relations. And
non-tax scholars have given very little consideration to the extent that in a very real sense almost
all important federalism questions are really questions about tax. Certainly, as we’ve seen here,
areas we thought far removed from tax, such as the effectiveness of local governance, prove
subject to very substantial tax influences. My work here implies that tax’s gravity may tug on
other bodies in the federalism solar system, as well. The doctrines of sovereign immunity,
53

qualified immunity, and 10th Amendment limits on federal “conscription” of state officials all
spring, to some significant extent, from judicial concerns about the transparency of, and lines of
accountability in, state government.183 Even leaving aside the revenue effects of federal tax rules,
the influence of the deduction on state incentives for transparency or opacity will likely seriously
affect all three doctrines. Further, the ways in which taxpayers understand and integrate taxes
and spending has implications for my previous work on the Spending Clause -- explication of
which I leave for further work.
In short, what we should think about section 164 depends on much more than the bottom
of a balance sheet. Any fully considered judgment must include our philosophy of mind, our
plan for the individual states’ place in an international marketplace, and our optimal design for
good local government. Seventy-five billion? That’s nothin’.
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